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Abstract
Background: Estimations of the demand for healthcare often rely on estimating the conditional
probabilities of being ill. Such estimate poses several problems due to sample selectivity problems
and an under-reporting of the incidence of illness. This study examines the effects of health
insurance on healthcare demand in Indonesia, using samples that are both unconditional and
conditional on being ill, and comparing the results.
Methods: The demand for outpatient care in three alternative providers was modeled using a
multinomial logit regression for samples unconditional on being ill (N = 16485) and conditional on
being ill (N = 5055). The ill sample was constructed from two measures of health status – activity
of daily living impairments and severity of illness – derived from the second round of panel data
from the Indonesian Family Life Survey. The recycling prediction method was used to predict the
distribution of utilization rates based on having health insurance and income status, while holding
all other variables constant.
Results: Both unconditional and conditional estimates yield similar results in terms of the direction
of the most covariates. The magnitude effects of insurance on healthcare demand are about 7.5%
(public providers) and 20% (private providers) higher for unconditional estimates than for
conditional ones. Further, exogenous variables in the former estimates explain a higher variation
of the model than that in the latter ones. Findings confirm that health insurance has a positive
impact on the demand for healthcare, with the highest effect found among the lowest income
group.
Conclusion: Conditional estimates do not suffer from statistical selection bias. Such estimates
produce smaller demand effects for health insurance than unconditional ones do. Whether to rely
on conditional or unconditional demand estimates depends on the purpose of study in question.
Findings also demonstrate that health insurance programs significantly improve access to healthcare
services, supporting the development of national health insurance programs to address under-
utilization of formal healthcare in Indonesia.
Background
Several published studies on healthcare demand estimate
the probabilities of using healthcare services conditional
on being ill sample [1-4]. The ill sample is usually gener-
ated from self-assessments of health status. Conditional
estimates are the preferred method because an individ-
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ual's decision to seek treatment implies that they are ill,
which is especially true in developing countries. Estima-
tions of healthcare demand, therefore, often rely on esti-
mating these marginal and conditional probabilities.
However, estimating healthcare demand conditional on
the event of illness poses several problems. First, there
may be an association between self-assessed health status
and healthcare use [5], raising the possibility of endog-
eneity (on the grounds that there are unobservable factors
correlated with both the likelihood to report illness and to
seek health care). The estimated responses of health care
demand to exogenous variables based on an ill sample
only would therefore be biased [6]. Second, conditional
estimates may also be susceptible to an underreporting of
the incidence of illness in surveys and, hence, would yield
only a lower-bound estimate [7]. Finally, the total effects
of prices on the demand can be inferred only from uncon-
ditionalestimation [8] and such estimations would pro-
duce long-run price effects [6].
This study examines the effects of health insurance on the
demand for outpatient care, using the second round of the
Indonesian Family Life Survey. The analysis was based
both on samples of unconditional responses and on sam-
ples of responses conditional on being ill. To construct the
latter sample, this study used a definition of sickness that
more accurately identifies people more likely to have used
healthcare services. Individuals included in the definition
were those who reported having at least one activity of
daily living (ADL) impairment and/or a serious illness.
This approach identified 5055 individuals in the condi-
tional sample, around 31% of the total unconditional
sample (N = 16485).
The purpose of this study is two-fold: first, to compare the
results of two approaches estimations – unconditional
and conditional estimates; second, to investigate the
effects of health insurance on the use of public and private
outpatient care.
The setting for this study is the country of Indonesia.
Located in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is an archipelago con-
sisting of more than 17,000 islands. With a population of
231.6 million in 2007, Indonesia is the fourth largest
country in the world after China, India and the United
States [9]. Inadequate access to formal health care is a seri-
ous problem in Indonesia. Following the economic crisis
during 1997–1998, the proportion of household survey
respondents who reported an illness or injury and sought
care from a modern health care provider declined by 25%
[10]. A policy option to improve access to formal health
care has been articulated by enacted the National Social
Security Law (UU No. 40/2004), which is now used as a
basis for introducing a national health insurance program.
This article contributes more evidence on the relative
magnitudes of conditional and unconditional demand
effects on healthcare demand. It also adds to the existing
evidence base by analyzing the effect of health insurance
programs on healthcare demand in the context of a devel-
oping country. In particular, this article provides evidence
on whether proposing a national health insurance pro-
gram would be welfare-enhancing in terms of increasing
access to formal healthcare in Indonesia.
Methods
Data – Indonesian Family Life Survey
This study uses data from the second round of the Indo-
nesian Family Life Survey (IFLS2), a panel survey carried
out by the RAND Corporation in conjunction with Indo-
nesian researchers and various international agencies. The
first round of survey (IFLS1) included interviews with
7,224 households covering 22,347 individuals within
those households. The second round of the survey, IFLS2,
re-contacted the same households interviewed in IFLS1
and successfully re-interviewed 6,751 (93.5%) of the
IFLS1 households. An overview of the IFLS1 and IFLS2
survey is described elsewhere [11,12].
Estimation – Multinomial Logit
The demand for healthcare is a function of health insur-
ance and a set of exogenous variables. The dependent var-
iable is outpatient care during the previous four weeks of
interview in three provider options: self-treatment, public
and private. I estimated a multinomial logit (MNL) model
in the form [13]:
Equation (1) was estimated using the maximum likeli-
hood procedure. The reference group is those who used
self-treatment. The vector xi represents a set of exogenous
variables and β represents regression parameters to be esti-
mated. The estimated equations above provide a set of
probabilities for the j+1 choices for an individual with
characteristics xi.
The MNL model assumes that the stochastic portions of
the conditional utility functions are uncorrelated across
alternatives. The model therefore requires the assumption
of 'independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)' be satis-
fied [13]. To validate this assumption, both a Hausman
specification and Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption
were employed. Another alternative to the MNL, which is
based on a reasonable distributional assumption on the
behavior of the disturbance term, is a nested multinomial
logit (NMNL). Yip et al. (1998) pointed out that the
Pr( ) , , Yj
e ji
e ki
k
j i ==
′
′
=
∑
=
b
b
x
x
for  or 
0
2 01 2
(1)Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2008, 6:15 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/6/1/15
Page 3 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
NMNL model produces essentially the same results as the
MNL model [14].
To ascertain the pure effects of insurance, specifically on
changes in the predicted probability of insurance across
income groups and to show the magnitude effects implied
by the coefficients, I used the recycling prediction method
[15]. From the MNL estimation, the predicted probabili-
ties were calculated by changing only insurance status and
income quintile, while holding all other characteristics of
the sample constant.
Table 1 provides a complete list of the variables used, with
their definitions and descriptive statistics. The exogenous
variables (xi) that were used in the analysis are detailed
below.
Health Insurance
Health insurance is expected to improve demand for
healthcare. Two types of health insurance programs were
included in the model: (i) health insurance for govern-
ment employees, known as Asuransi Kesehatan (Askes)
and (ii) health insurance for private sector employees,
known as Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (Jamsostek). The
Askes represents a mandatory insurance that covers all civil
servants, pensioners of civil servants and armed forces. It
also covers their families and survivors. The scheme pro-
vides the benefit of comprehensive health care, provided
mainly through public health facilities. The Jamsostek
scheme covers private employees and their dependents up
to a maximum of three children. Benefits include compre-
hensive health services through both public and private
providers [16].
Table 1: Definition variables used in the analysis
Exogenous
 variable
Definition Unconditional Conditional
Mean SDev Mean S.Dev
Askes 1 if govt-employ insurance; 0 otherwise 0.098 0.298 0.101 0.301
Jamsostek 1 if priv-employ insurance; 0 otherwise 0.052 0.222 0.047 0.213
Askes*Inc. Interaction Askes and income 0.162 0.752 0.166 0.801
Jamsostek*Inc. Interaction Jamsostek and income 0.071 0.409 0.066 0.392
Symptoms 1 if had ≥ 1 symptom; 0 otherwise 0.797 0.402 0.879 0.327
ADLs limit 1 if had ≥ 1 limited ADL; 0 otherwise 0.244 0.429 0.795 0.404
Vgood GHSR Very good health status 0.090 0.286 0.067 0.249
Good GHS General health status was good 0.798 0.401 0.707 0.455
Poor GHS General health was bad & very bad 0.112 0.315 0.226 0.418
Serious ill 1 if had serious ill; 0 otherwise 0.113 0.316 0.367 0.482
Female 1 if female; 0 otherwise 0.551 0.497 0.731 0.444
HHs size Number of household members 5.852 2.554 5.987 2.693
Married 1 if married; 0 otherwise 0.836 0.370 0.874 0.332
No-schoolingR Had no education 0.121 0.326 0.167 0.373
Elementary Had some primary education 0.472 0.499 0.467 0.499
Junior Had some secondary education 0.136 0.342 0.124 0.329
Senior Had some senior education 0.201 0.401 0.176 0.381
High Had some higher education 0.070 0.256 0.066 0.249
Age (years) Individual age in years 36.64 11.55 39.69 12.46
Ln. income Log natural per-capita income (Rp) 11.080 0.856 11.126 0.867
Electricity 1 if had electricity; 0 otherwise 0.867 0.340 0.871 0.335
Ln. travel-cost Log one way travel-costs to health post 9.765 8.981 10.194 8.852
Ln. travel-time Log one way travel-time to health post 15.040 3.143 14.965 3.110
Urban 1 if urban; 0 otherwise 0.480 0.500 0.501 0.500
Region: JakartaR Jakarta residence 0.092 0.289 0.107 0.309
Sumatra Lived in Sumatra 0.199 0.399 0.217 0.412
West Java Lived in West Java 0.171 0.376 0.183 0.387
Central Java Lived in Central Java 0.186 0.389 0.141 0.349
East Java Lived in East Java 0.141 0.348 0.091 0.287
Bali & WNT Lived in Bali and WNT 0.110 0.313 0.150 0.357
Kalimantan Lived in Kalimantan 0.045 0.207 0.056 0.230
Sulawesi Lived in Sulawesi 0.055 0.228 0.055 0.229
Sample size (N) 16,485 5,055
RIndicate the reference (omitted groups) in the MNL regressions.Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2008, 6:15 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/6/1/15
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Health insurance programs in this study are assumed to be
exogenous given that such programs are mandated either
by the government or employers, and hence unobservable
individual factors to join particular health insurance
scheme are not likely to be a serious problem. If insurance
is indeed endogenous, then evaluating the impact of
insurance on healthcare demand without correcting for
endogeneity will yield biased estimates [17-19]. To guar-
antee that health insurance is indeed exogenous, I tested
for the possible endogeneity of insurance using the fol-
lowing two steps [17]. First, a reduced form of insurance
participation was estimated using a probit model (a first-
stage regression). This regression included all covariates in
the demand equation in addition to proposed identifying
variables. Second, the predicted values of the insurance
variable derived from the first-stage regression and the
observed values of the insurance variable were then
included in the demand equation. If the predicted coeffi-
cient for insurance is not significant, then one can assume
that health insurance is an exogenous variable. Testing for
endogeneity was also performed using an instrumental
variable (IV) estimation [20].
Health
Three measures of individual health status were taken into
account: symptoms, activity of daily living (ADL) impair-
ment, and general assessment of health status (GHS).
Individuals who reported having at least one symptom
and one difficulty of ADL impairment were grouped as
having symptoms and ADL impairment, respectively.
GHS respondents were reclassified into three groups: very
good, good and poor (aggregated from very bad and bad
of the GHS). A dummy variable indicating whether an
individual had a serious illness in the last four years was
also included. The severity of the disease was self-
reported.
Since the study used a sample that was conditional on
being ill, health status was also potentially endogenous
due to a sample selection problem [5,6]. A probit model
with the sample selection was carried out to investigate
whether conditional estimates are affected by selection
bias [21,22].
Income
Income is considered an important determinant of the
demand for healthcare. This study used household
expenditure as a proxy for income. Information about
income is biased and difficult to assess in many develop-
ing countries, particularly in subsistence farming house-
holds. Income data is also typically prone to under-
reporting and measurement error, ignoring the contribu-
tion of own production and in-kind transfers. Household
expenditures were adjusted with the 1997 consumer price
index data, using Jakarta as a reference in order to correct
for price differences in various locations. To control the
effect of household size, per-capita household expendi-
tures were used. For the remainder of the paper, expendi-
tures are referred to as income.
The effects of insurance may differ across income groups.
An interaction term for insurance and income was there-
fore included in the model. This interaction allows one to
test whether income has different effects of insurance on
the demand.
Other variables that were considered and included are:
female (1/0), household size, married (1/0), education (a
dummy variable indicating: no school [the reference] ele-
mentary, junior, senior and high), electricity (1/0), age
(years), one way travel cost (Rupiah) and travel time
(minutes) to health facilities, and urban (1/0). To control
for regional differences, dummy variables for the regional
location of the survey site were also included.
Results
Figure 1 shows that 70% of ill individuals used self-treat-
ment, 19% saw a private provider and the remaining 11%
sought a public provider. The distribution of uncondi-
tional samples was 81%, 13%, and 6% for self-treatment,
private and public provider, respectively.
Testing the Endogeneity of Insurance
Results of the endogeneity test suggest that having health
insurance is indeed an exogenous variable (i.e., the pre-
dicted value of the insurance variable when inserted in the
demand equation is not significantly different from zero).
The predicted value of insurance was generated from a
probit model of insurance participation. This was esti-
mated separately for Askes and Jamsostek, using identifying
variables and all other exogenous variables in the MNL
model. The identifying variables used included: employ-
ment status of the household head (whether public or pri-
vate employee); whether individual were active in
community meetings or water organizations, and;
whether an individual's relationship to the household
head is as a spouse. These variables were selected as appro-
priate instruments since they turned out to be insignifi-
cant in the demand equation, but were highly correlated
with insurance participation. R2 for the insurance equa-
tion (first-stage regression) in the unconditional estimate
was 0.31 and 0.21 for Askes and Jamsostek, respectively.
While for conditional estimate, it was 0.26 and 0.31 for
Askes and Jamsostek, respectively.
The validity of the instruments was also tested using an
over-identification restrictions test, i.e., Sargan-test statis-
tic [13,20]. The test did not reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments were uncorrelated with the error term of
the demand function in all cases. In unconditional esti-Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2008, 6:15 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/6/1/15
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mates, the p-values of the Sargan-test for the public and
private models were 0.36 and 0.11, respectively. Whilst in
conditional estimates, the p-values were 0.513 and 0.363
for the public and private models, respectively. This sug-
gests that the models are reasonably well specified and the
instruments are valid.
Using the IV estimation, the endogeneity test also failed to
reject the null hypothesis. Table 2 reports summary statis-
tics for testing the endogeneity of health insurance derived
from the IV estimation. The test for both Askes and Jam-
sostek in all cases was not significantly different from zero,
indicating that the suspected endogenous variable is
indeed exogenous, and no corrections for endogeneity are
needed.
Sample Selection Model
As noted earlier, conditional estimates are likely to be
biased. A probit model with a sample selection was
employed using the 'heckprob' command in STATA [15].
Determinants of sickness included all covariates that were
used in the demand equation plus several other indentify-
ing variables. The instruments used included: smoking
status; household head's employment status (whether
public or private employee); whether individuals used a
septic tank for defecation; whether individual were
involved in community activities, and; four dummy vari-
ables indicating type of garbage disposal (e.g. collected,
burned, discarded on premises, and other). The results of
the probit model with a sample selection yielded an insig-
nificant correlation between the error terms – i.e., Chi-
squared(1) = 0.02, with a p-value 0.88 – ruling out any
possibility of sample selection bias [22].
Model Estimation Results
Table 3 displays the results of unconditional (left panel)
and conditional (right panel) demand estimates. The last
row of the table reports R-squared values as well as the
results of IIA assumption tests. The R-squared values sug-
gest that the covariates explain 14% and 12% variation in
the unconditional and conditional models, respectively.
Both Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests indicated that the
MNL model passed the IIA assumption, suggesting that
retaining the present model does not lead to inconsistent
estimates [13].
The MNL estimates show that the coefficient estimate for
Askes insurance was positive for public and private provid-
ers, but only significant for the former with a p-value at the
1% level. The findings hold true for both unconditional
and conditional estimates. The coefficient estimate of the
interaction between Askes and income resulted only in a
positive and significant effect for public services providers
for the unconditional sample. The effect was negative for
the conditional sample but not statistically significant.
The coefficient estimate of Jamsostek  insurance in the
unconditional estimates was positive for both provider
The distribution of providers used four-weeks prior to the IFLS survey Figure 1
The distribution of providers used four-weeks prior to the IFLS survey.
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types, although there was a difference in the level of signif-
icance (i.e., 10% at public providers and 1% at private
ones). While in the conditional estimates, the coefficient
of Jamsostek was significant for the private provider only.
The coefficient estimate of the interaction (between Jam-
sostek and income) was negative for both provider types
and significant at the 1% levels, except for public provider
in the conditional estimates. The negative coefficients of
the interaction terms taken together suggest that the
effects of Jamsostek insurance on the probability of using
formal health care were higher among the poor.
Results of most covariates were consistent with expecta-
tions. A general picture emerges that both unconditional
and conditional estimates yielded similar results with
respect to the direction of most covariates. This includes
health status, gender, household size, marital status, edu-
cation, income, electricity usage and travel costs.
Recycling Prediction Results
This section presents the results of the recycling prediction
method to ascertain the pure effects of insurance and to
show the magnitude effects implied by the coefficients.
Based upon unconditional and conditional MNL estima-
tions, I predicted the probabilities of using outpatient care
(self-treatment, care with public providers and care with
private providers) by changing only the health insurance
status while holding all other variables at their mean.
Three scenarios were used to change the value of health
insurance status: (i) assigning all individuals in the sam-
ple as 'uninsured,' (ii) expansion of Askes insurance to all
individuals in the sample, and (iii) expansion of Jamsostek
to all individuals in the sample. For each scenario, a pre-
diction was then made for each income level. The con-
stant differences in the probabilities predicted under these
scenarios (uninsured, Askes, and Jamsostek), therefore, are
exclusively owing to the effects of insurance. Table 4 sum-
marizes the results of the predictions.
The first panel of Table 4 shows that about 72% of the
uninsured who reported being ill opted, on average, for
self-treatments compared with 62% for Askes beneficiaries
and only 55% for Jamsostek  members, suggesting that
uninsured persons have the highest probability of using
self-treatment. Individuals covered by Askes significantly
demonstrated the highest probability of choosing public
Table 2: Summary statistics testing for the endogeneity of the health insurance variable
Statistics Tests* Public providers Private providers
DF** Statistic p-value DF** Statistic p-value
Unconditional estimates (N = 16485):
Askes & Jamsostek
-Wu-Hausman F(2,16453) 0.7326 0.4807 F(2,16453) 0.19261 0.8248
-Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq(2) 1.4679 0.4800 Chi-sq(2) 0.38597 0.8245
Askes only
-Wu-Hausman F(1,16454 0.0850 0.7707 F(1,16454) 0.34298 0.5581
-Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq(1) 0.0851 0.7705 Chi-sq(1) 0.34361 0.5578
Jamsostek only
-Wu-Hausman F(1,16454) 0.8811 0.3479 F(1,16454) 0.18927 0.6635
-Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq(1) 0.8828 0.3475 Chi-sq(1) 0.18962 0.6632
Conditional estimates (N = 5055):
Askes & Jamsostek
-Wu-Hausman F(2,5023) 0.14599 0.8642 F(2,5023) 1.34468 0.2607
-Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq(2) 0.29383 0.8634 Chi-sq(2) 2.70505 0.2586
Askes only
-Wu-Hausman F(1,5024) 0.00437 0.9473 F(1,5024) 0.47523 0.4906
-Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq(1) 0.00439 0.9472 Chi-sq(1) 0.47811 0.4893
Jamsostek only
-Wu-Hausman F(1,5024) 0.24074 0.6237 F(1,5024) 2.64705 0.1038
-Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq(1) 0.24221 0.6226 Chi-sq(1) 2.66198 0.1028
*Statistic tests were calculated using Instrumental Variable estimation [15].
** Degree of freedom (DF).Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2008, 6:15 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/6/1/15
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providers, consistent across all income quintiles (second
panel). Evidence from the conditional estimates indicates
that beneficiaries of Askes had, on average, a 55% higher
probability (increasing from 18.2% to 28.2%) to use pub-
lic providers than the uninsured. Jamsostek beneficiaries
also had a 25% higher predicted probability to use outpa-
tient care in public providers compared to the uninsured.
Table 3: MNL estimation results using self-treatment as the comparison group
Unconditional estimates Conditional estimates
Public Providers Private providers Public providers Private providers
βa [se]b βa [se]b βa [se]b βa [se]b
Askes 0.654‡ [0.101] 0.125 [0.141] 0.511‡ [0.153] 0.023 [0.193]
Jamsostek 0.512* [0.270] 1.362‡ [0.187] 0.314 [0.377] 1.086‡ [0.344]
Askes*Inc 0.065* [0.040] -0.014 [0.049] -0.031 [0.067] 0.019 [0.053]
Jamsostek*Inc. -0.760‡ [0.239] -0.388‡ [0.112] -0.529* [0.286] -0.599‡ [0.228]
Symptoms 1.955‡ [0.123] 2.436‡ [0.220] 1.287‡ [0.176] 2.704‡ [0.454]
ADLs limit 0.257‡ [0.059] 0.390‡ [0.079] 0.233* [0.132] 0.373‡ [0.142]
Vgood GHSR
Good GHS 0.359‡ [0.114] 0.472‡ [0.148] 0.372* [0.196] 0.396* [0.238]
Poor GHS 1.383‡ [0.126] 1.698‡ [0.164] 1.421‡ [0.207] 1.645‡ [0.251]
Serious-ill 0.537‡ [0.073] 0.847‡ [0.084] 0.491‡ [0.103] 0.859‡ [0.126]
Female 0.604‡ [0.056] 0.250‡ [0.074] 0.548‡ [0.100] 0.371‡ [0.124]
HHs size 0.007 [0.011] 0.048‡ [0.013] 0.003 [0.016] 0.023 [0.019]
Married 0.644‡ [0.100] -0.198* [0.102] 0.744‡ [0.169] -0.021 [0.160]
No-schoolingR
Elementary 0.089 [0.080] 0.372‡ [0.141] 0.074 [0.113] 0.424† [0.177]
Junior 0.038 [0.108] 0.459‡ [0.168] 0.024 [0.164] 0.400* [0.228]
Senior 0.039 [0.108] 0.512‡ [0.164] 0.000 [0.164] 0.606‡ [0.219]
High -0.343† [0.151] 0.714‡ [0.185] -0.08 [0.221] 0.875‡ [0.259]
Age (years) -0.001 [0.003] 0.004 [0.004] -0.001 [0.004] -0.004 [0.005]
Ln. income 0.069* [0.039] 0.431‡ [0.051] 0.038 [0.059] 0.380‡ [0.077]
Electricity 0.495‡ [0.083] 1.144‡ [0.198] 0.368‡ [0.126] 0.919‡ [0.248]
Ln. travel-cost 0.026‡ [0.009] 0.027† [0.012] 0.024* [0.013] 0.055‡ [0.018]
Ln. travel-time 0.004 [0.003] 0.003 [0.004] 0.001 [0.005] -0.002 [0.006]
Urban -0.384‡ [0.061] 0.193† [0.084] -0.377‡ [0.092] -0.002 [0.124]
Region:JakartaR
Sumatra 0.324‡ [0.119] -0.264† [0.127] 0.05 [0.172] -0.575‡ [0.185]
West Java 0.314‡ [0.118] -0.053 [0.117] 0.280* [0.170] 0.129 [0.164]
Central Java 0.242† [0.121] 0.163 [0.122] 0.183 [0.180] -0.082 [0.188]
East Java 0.516‡ [0.130] 0.578‡ [0.137] 0.365* [0.200] 0.552‡ [0.206]
Bali & WNT 0.825‡ [0.127] 0.301† [0.144] 0.483‡ [0.180] 0.149 [0.196]
Kalimantan 0.692‡ [0.149] -0.902‡ [0.256] 0.576‡ [0.211] -1.261‡ [0.368]
Sulawesi 0.604‡ [0.151] -0.490† [0.236] 0.441† [0.219] -0.649* [0.338]
Constant -7.121‡ [0.504] -13.031‡ [0.686] -5.766‡ [0.793] -12.365‡ [1.081]
N 16,485 5055
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.118
Wald Chi-sq(58) 2308.17; sig. 0.000 782.78; sig. 0.000
Hausman test 16.7 (omitted-public), p-val = 0.98 1.18 (omitted-public), p-val = 1.00
IIA: X2 (30) 13.1 (omitted-private), p-val = 0.99 5.11 (omitted-private), p-val = 1.00
Small-Hsiao 41.7 (omitted-public), p-val = 0.08; 18.3 (omitted-public), p-val = 0.95
test IIA: X2(30) 16.5 (omitted-private), p-val = 0.98 34.1 (omitted-private), p-val = 0.28
aThe estimated parameters β; superscript ‡,†, and *significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
bRobust standard errors given in [brackets].
RReferences (omitted groups).Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2008, 6:15 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/6/1/15
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Table 4 also shows that the gap between the lowest- and
highest-income quintiles of uninsured healthcare users
was wider in private providers than public ones. The ratio
of the highest to the lowest-income quintile among the
uninsured, derived from a conditional estimation, was
0.75 (14.85/19.69) for public providers and 3.59 for pri-
vate ones. The gap between the lowest and highest-
income quintiles in private outpatient use among Jam-
sostek member was the smallest (2.9 and 2.8 de rived from
unconditional and conditional estimates, respectively). It
is also worth noting that the highest income bracket of
uninsured people had the lowest probability of choosing
self-treatment and the highest probability of using private
providers.
Figure 2 depicts the effects of health insurance programs
on the demand for public and private outpatient care. The
greatest effect of Jamsostek insurance on both public and
private outpatient use was found in the lowest income
quintile. The effect declines as the quintile level increases.
This pattern corresponds with the estimated coefficient of
the interaction term between Jamsostek and income, which
is always negative (see Table 3).
Discussion
Estimating healthcare demand conditional on an event of
illness poses a problem due to possibility endogeneity of
self-reported illnesses resulting from sample selection bias
[5,6,21]. Sample selection bias refers to the problem
where the dependent variable is only observed for a
restricted (non-random) sample. This study, however,
confirms that conditional estimates do not suffer from the
sample selectivity problem, in-line with a study con-
ducted in Côte d'Ivoire [6]. Another problem with condi-
tional estimates relates to the underreporting of incidents
of illness in surveys [7]. However, this study minimizes
the risk of underreporting by adopting two health status
measurements (i.e., activity of daily living impairments
and the incidence of severe illness) to capture the event of
illness.
This study found that both unconditional and conditional
estimates yielded similar results, especially in term of the
sign of the variable of interest as well as most of the other
covariates. However, the results suggest that conditional
estimates yield a lower insurance effect on the utilization
of outpatient care than unconditional ones. The effects of
Askes on the use of public outpatient care were about 7.5
percent lower in the conditional estimates (55%) than in
Table 4: Predicted probabilities of provider usage under different insurance schemes and income quintiles
Unconditional estimates (%) Conditional estimates (%)
Uninsured Askes Jamsostek Uninsured Askes Jamsostek
Self-treatments:
Quintile 1st (lowest) 84.77 77.20 74.74 75.67 65.44 62.45
Quintile 2nd 83.34 75.68 71.69 73.41 63.24 58.20
Quintile 3rd 81.80 74.14 68.88 71.27 61.29 54.83
Quintile 4th 81.22 73.84 66.88 70.99 61.77 53.16
Quintile 5th(highest) 79.55 73.11 62.78 68.51 60.63 48.06
Average 82.02 74.70 68.73 71.68 62.29 54.77
Ratio (Q-5th/Q-1st) 0.94 0.95 0.84 0.91 0.93 0.77
Public providers:
Quintile 1st (lowest) 12.34 20.01 16.50 19.69 30.32 24.65
Quintile 2nd 12.55 20.34 16.29 19.78 30.47 23.74
Quintile 3rd 12.81 20.66 16.09 19.87 30.55 22.97
Quintile 4th 12.05 19.60 14.80 17.94 27.87 20.01
Quintile 5th(highest) 10.23 16.74 11.79 14.85 23.35 15.36
Average 11.95 19.40 14.99 18.23 28.23 20.97
Ratio (Q-5th/Q-1st) 0.83 0.84 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.62
Private providers:
Quintile 1st (lowest) 2.90 2.79 8.75 4.63 4.24 12.90
Quintile 2nd 4.11 3.98 12.02 6.81 6.28 18.05
Quintile 3rd 5.39 5.20 15.03 8.86 8.16 22.20
Quintile 4th 6.73 6.56 18.32 11.07 10.35 26.83
Quintile 5th(highest) 10.22 10.14 25.43 16.64 16.02 36.58
Average 6.03 5.90 16.28 10.09 9.49 24.26
Ratio (Q-5th/Q-1st) 3.53 3.63 2.91 3.59 3.78 2.84Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2008, 6:15 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/6/1/15
Page 9 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
the unconditional ones (62%). The demand effects of
Jamsostek for outpatient care with private providers were
about 20 percent lower in the conditional estimates than
in the unconditional ones (156% and 176%, respec-
tively). This is inconsistent with the finding of a previous
study. Dow found that conditional estimates yielded price
elasticity about 25% higher than those derived from
unconditional estimates [6]. Unconditional estimates are
preferred since conditional estimates may be statistically
biased. Even when properly estimated, such estimates can
only be interpreted as short-run effects.
A critical question is when should we use unconditional
estimates and when should we rely on conditional esti-
mates? The answer depends on the purpose of the
research. When the research aims to measure long-run
price effects, unconditional estimates are the desired
option. However, if the research is designed, for instance,
to measure equity in healthcare utilization, conditional
estimates are preferable [4,23]. Because conditional esti-
mations do not suffer from statistical selection bias, they
are acceptable for short-term analysis, and may even be
preferable since they are less costly to implement. For
instance, questionnaires need only be administered to
those who are sick. Conditional surveys are worthwhile,
especially in developing countries like in Indonesia, since
research resources (i.e., time, money, manpower, etc.) are
usually inadequate.
This study also investigated the effects of health insurance
on healthcare demand. The findings show that health
insurance has a strongly positive impact on the demand
for outpatient care in Indonesia. This supports theories of
health insurance [24], and concurs with previously pub-
lished studies conducted in other contexts [17-19,25,26].
The findings reveal problems for the uninsured and their
predicted probability of using outpatient care with private
providers, particularly those in the lowest income quin-
tile. Examining the ratio of healthcare use among the
highest to lowest-income quintiles among uninsured peo-
ple, we see that the lowest income groups are less likely to
use private outpatient services. This is due to increasingly
expensive private health facilities. The poor are therefore
more likely to opt for cheaper treatments for their illness,
such as using outpatient public facility or self-treatment
(i.e., buying drug from a pharmacy or simply not seeking
care at all). The implication for equitable outcomes in this
situation gives cause for concern.
However, once people are covered by insurance, particu-
larly those in the lowest income groups, they utilize sub-
The effects of health insurance on the use of public and private providers Figure 2
The effects of health insurance on the use of public and private providers. (Dash purple-line indicates the effects of 
Askes on the demand public outpatient care. Red-line and blue-line with triangle marker point to the effects of Jamsostek on the 
demand public and private outpatient care, respectively. In all lines, the value of the percentage (%) reveals the magnitude 
effects of health insurance on healthcare demand as compared to the uninsured).
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stantially more health services. This study demonstrated
an over-proportional demand effect of insurance with the
effects more pronounced in the lowest income groups.
These findings implicitly indicate that low-income people
have a higher price elasticity of demand, a finding that is
consistent with empirical evidence elsewhere
[1,19,25,26]. A study done by Pradhan et al. (2007) also
found that the effect of the targeted price subsidy offered
through the health card program was largest for the poor-
est quintile [27]. From a public health perspective, these
findings are of substantial interest. It suggests that expand-
ing health insurance in Indonesia, as is the current policy
thrust, will have a stronger impact on increasing formal
care usage rates among the poor. The introduction of a
demand-side subsidy to insure the 76.4 million poor in
Indonesia is supported by the findings of this study.
Research findings also indicate that among uninsured
people the poorest have a higher probability of using pub-
lic providers than the richest quintile. Arguably, this is
particularly the case with regards to the extensive subsidi-
zation of medical care costs by the government that keep
user costs in public health facilities generally low. Mean
spending on outpatient medical care was only 1.5% and
4.8% of total income for public and private health facili-
ties, respectively. Therefore, poorest uninsured people
who devoted on average about 4% of their income on
healthcare are still able to afford healthcare. A study con-
ducted in Indonesia also found that the share of house-
hold expenditures spent on health in 1997 was only 1.9%
for urban areas and 1.6% for rural areas [10].
Conclusion
This study estimates the effects of health insurance on
healthcare demand in Indonesia using samples that are
both unconditional and conditional on being ill. The lat-
ter approach does not suffer from the sample selectivity
problem. Both estimations yield very similar outputs with
respect to the direction of most of the covariates. The mag-
nitude effects of insurance on demand for healthcare,
however, are higher in the former estimates than the lat-
ter. The choice between using unconditional or condi-
tional estimates for future studies should be determined
by the main purpose of the research.
This study supports growing literature that health care
demand is regressive irrespective of insurance status.
Health insurance significantly improves access to health
care services, with the largest demand effect of insurance
found among individuals in the lowest income quintile.
This study therefore supports the expansion of insurance
programs or the establishment of a national health insur-
ance program in order to address under-utilization of for-
mal healthcare in Indonesia. A demand-side subsidy to
pay insurance premiums for the poor is also recom-
mended.
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